



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
JOINT SUBSIDIARY PLANS DIVISION  
JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

SPDM-283-51  
13 July 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK G. WISNER,  
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION:

Subject: OPC Strategic Planning.

Reference: ADPC Memo, 8 Jun 51, subject  
as above.

1. The draft of OPC Strategic Plan, which was submitted to this office for consideration and comment has been carefully reviewed. I consider it an excellent summary of our present national position and of OPC's strategic concept of its future operations. It should be of much assistance to all concerned in developing the necessary specific plans for peacetime operations and the transition to a wartime status. Attached as an enclosure are detailed comments on matters of clarity or military policy. My general comment on the entire plan concerns the basic philosophy of whether or not a sufficiently high priority is given to operations against the Soviet Union itself, and to operations in general as opposed to plans and preparations. I note that in the phasing of operations the "preparations for major covert offensive against the USSR" follow those of "defense of the non-communist world" and "operations against the satellites." It is my opinion that the entire plan should be based on a concept of the preparations and conduct of a major covert offensive against the Soviet Union, concurrently, of course, with a view toward maintaining our current favorable position in critical countries and specifically damaging the Soviet Union where possible through the satellite countries. I note that the plan provides for proceeding concurrently with preparations for a general war, and I am naturally in agreement.

2. If primary emphasis is placed on reaching the heart-land of the communist control system as against affording that problem a third priority, it appears to me that both

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the enormous possibilities, as well as the difficulties, will be more readily highlighted and the detailed operational plans can be formulated more readily and consistently. While I agree with the statement in the plan that the attainment of an ultimate objective often involves the pursuit of several lesser objectives, I feel that the objective should be the Soviet Union with all operations attendant upon that aim. In that manner, the entire plan would be consistent with NSC 68, and furthermore, have the same objective in both peace and war. As an example, a major program to cause the downfall of the government of a satellite nation should not be regarded as an aim in itself, but should be viewed in the light of the effect of such a loss to the USSR.

3. The above comment is not intended in any way to change the basic concept of the plan as written, but rather to adjust the thinking of those preparing detailed plans to the end that all such plans will be held together by a common objective.

L. C. STEVENS,  
Rear Admiral, USN,  
Chief.

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**E N C L O S U R E**

**SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISIONS**

1. Paragraph 4, page 2: The parenthetical part of this paragraph should read: "....a signal that general war may be at hand and the Agency will be prepared to place the Emergency War Plan in effect."

2. Paragraph 3, page 10: Add: Specifically, operations may be undertaken in which, although chartered security precautions have been regarded, a calculated risk is taken that disclosure or compromise would be justified by the results expected.

3. Paragraph 5, page 24: It is understood that the intent of this paragraph is that your forces will have been so augmented in prosecuting the "cold war" that no general adjustment will be required. It is believed, however, that such definitive statements as are made will restrict planners in allowing for flexibility. Most certainly all resources, overt and covert, will be affected by the locale of the major conflict, which may or may not be of our own choosing. Accordingly, it is recommended that the paragraph read substantially as follows: "Transition from Cold War to General War: The logistic requirements for covert operations are of similar order and type for both cold and general war. The men, money, and materiel committed to the prosecution of the cold war will be in place and available for use in a general war. However, in the event that the major enemy attack is made in some area where covert resources have not been fully developed, a revision of priorities for the use and support of those resources may be required."

4. Paragraph VIII, A and B, page 25: It is assumed that this paragraph is not applicable in all areas in the event of general war. The problem of communications in wartime is being considered in connection with your Strategic War Plan.

Encl to  
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